Stedronsky, 2026 ESD 108
OFFICE OF THE ELECTION SUPERVISOR
for the
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
IN RE: STEDRONSKY, ) Protest Decision 2026 ESD 108
ROSEMARY, ) Issued: June 9, 2026
Protestor. ) OES Case No. P-139-032826
______________________________)
INTRODUCTION
Rosemary Stedronsky filed a post-election protest on behalf of the Power for All Slate challenging the results of Local 63’s delegate election. She alleges a lack of security of the PO boxes where the undeliverable and voted ballots were maintained. She also alleges a lack of transparency at the count in violation of observer rights.
BACKGROUND
The Local 63 election took place on Thursday, March 26, 2026. There were a total of thirteen (13) observers present: six (6) from the Power for All Slate and seven (7) from the Cammack/Stewart OZ Teamsters United 2026 Slate. Stedronsky was one of the observers on behalf of the Power for All Slate. Deborah Schaaf, OES Regional Director for the Far West, and Pearl Moenahele, also an OES representative, were at the count and supervised the election. A copy of the OES Rules for Observer Conduct was provided to each observer at the Local 63 delegate election, which includes the following:
During the tally of ballots, observers may challenge the manner or accuracy of the way votes are read from marked ballots and recorded on the tally sheet. State objections to election officials immediately so corrective measures can be taken.
Alleged Ballot Security Concerns
Protestor challenges the security of the PO boxes where the undeliverable and voted ballots were maintained arising from (1) the fact that there were ballots from Local 63’s officer election and Local 166’s officer election in the Voted Ballot PO Box (defined below) and (2) because she was unable to “verify the number of undeliverable ballots received.
1. Ballots from Other Elections
According to protestor, 129 ballots in PO box 1970 at the Rialto Post Office located at 241 West Rialto, Ave., Rialto, CA 92376, which was designated to hold returned voted ballots for Local 63’s delegate election (the “Voted Ballot PO Box”), were identified as ballots from past elections unrelated to Local 63’s delegate election. Specifically, she alleges that 75 were from Local 63’s local officer election held on October 20, 2025, and were post marked with dates between October 20, 2025 and February 10, 2026; 54 were from Local 166 local officer election held on December 15, 2025, and were post marked with dates between December 2025 and February 2026.[1]
When UniLect was asked about this on election day, Andrew Burkhart, Director of Operations for UniLect, stated that “this can happen” most likely because UniLect does not always clear out the PO Box after each election. Catherine Burkhart, Director of Elections, confirmed that in addition to Local 63’s delegate election, UniLect used the Voted Ballot PO Box for Local 63’s and Local 166’s officer elections. Following this response, the protestor did not ask about or object to the security of the PO boxes and the election proceeded.
There is no dispute that ballots from Local 63’s officer election and Local 166’s election were in the Voted Ballot PO Box along with Local 63’s delegate election ballots.
Each of the returned ballots—whether from Local 63’s delegate election, Local 63’s officer election, or Local 166’s officer election—were all clearly marked with the relevant election on the outside envelope. All of the ballots from the Local 63 delegate election were segregated from the others. Only Local 63’s delegate election ballots were counted.
Following the election, on March 30, 2026,[2] Stedronsky states that she “began to question, once again, the integrity and legitimacy” of UniLect’s responses to her inquiries about the returned ballots from other elections in the Voted Ballot PO Box, ballot handling and security. She claims that if the Voted Ballot PO Box was not cleared after each election as Burkhart stated, then ballots from Local 63’s October 2025 officer election—particularly those postmarked before December 15, 2025—should have already been collected and removed when the PO Box was opened for Local 166’s ballot count on December 15, 2025. Therefore, she asserts that such ballots should not have remained in the Voted Ballot PO Box and been discovered during the March 26, 2026 delegate election count. Based on this, she alleges there is a discrepancy in ballot handling or that the Voted Ballot PO Box was not properly secured.
UniLect denies that any ballots in their custody were mishandled or not adequately secured. Catherine Burkhart told the investigator that she opened PO Box 1970 at USPS Rialto for the Local 63 Officer election on October 20, 2025. She stated that UniLect customarily closes the PO Box after each election,[3] but in this case they left it open to use for the Local 63 delegate election in 2026 (if there was one). Following Local 63’s officer election, Local 166 hired UniLect to conduct its officer election on December 15, 2025. Catherine Burkhart stated that she was in the process of opening a PO Box at a USPS facility closer to Local 166, but USPS delay made it impossible to secure the PO Box by the deadline. UniLect has used the Rialto USPS for many elections over the years, so UniLect decided to use PO Box 1970 for the Local 166 officer election ballots as well.
Catherine Burkhart stated that, as the authorized agent, and consistent with UniLect’s practice, she informed the Rialto postmaster in writing about each upcoming election and provided the instructions set out below instructing the postmaster to place the necessary safeguards on the Voted Ballot PO Box used to collect voted ballots.
Under no circumstances should anyone be allowed to retrieve, remove, add mail to or even review the contents of Post Box 1970 until the authorized agent on USPS Form 1093 is present for pick-up and observers are present to observe the pickup of ballots.
Because the Voted Ballot PO Box was still being used to collect the late ballots from the Local 63 officer election and the Local 166 officer election, which was unusual, USPS removed the Local 63 officer election ballots from the Voted Ballot PO Box (as the count had already occurred), to a separate secure location at the post office until after the Local 166 officer ballots had been collected for the count. USPS then returned those Local 63 officer election ballots to the Voted Ballot PO Box following the Local 166 officer election count. All ballots remained in the custody of authorized personnel at all times except those collected for the Local 166 officer count. The Election Supervisor did not supervise and does not have the authority to supervise either Local 63 or Local 166’s officer election.
Catherine Burkart stated that, consistent with UniLect’s practice, she provided her typical instructions to the post office in connection with the Local 63 delegate election. She provided a copy of the letter she sent to the postmaster corroborating her statements. The letter, dated February 24, 2026, “RE: Teamsters Local 63 DELEGATE Election 2026 POST BOX #1970 SPECIAL RESTRICTED ACCESS” states:
The UniLect Corporation is an independent provider of election services. We assist public and private entities with their election needs. As you are aware, Postal Box 1970 was recently used for two (2) Mail Ballot Officer Elections that we administered on behalf of Teamsters Local 63 and Local 166. This Postal Box will now be used for all incoming Teamsters Local 63 DELEGATE Election Ballot Packets which voting members will be returning to us. Ballots will be mailed out on or around February 24, 2026, when the election period begins and will end on March 26, 2026, at 11:00 a.m., when we present at your Post Office to pick up the ballots.
This letter is to request your cooperation in securing Postal Box 1970 until March 26, 2026, which is Delegate Election Day for Teamsters Local 63. At 11:00 a.m. on 3/26/26, Catherine Burkhart with UniLect will be picking up all the returned Ballot Packets after providing identification. Very important: Only the authorized USPS Form 1093 UniLect representative with California identification is to be given the Post Box keys or access to the contents of Postal Box 1970 at the arranged time stated above. Under no circumstances should anyone be allowed to retrieve, remove, add mail to or even review the contents of Post Box 1970 until the authorized agent on USPS Form 1093 is present for pick-up and observers are present to observe the pickup of ballots.
UniLect will be in contact with you approximately one week prior to the close of the election to confirm the above. We appreciate your full assistance and diligence in this matter.
(emphasis in original).
As instructed in the above letter and consistent with Local 63’s LUEP, ballots placed in the Voted Ballot PO Box were prohibited from being retrieved until election day by Catherine Burkhart, the authorized agent, and observers.
- Number of Undeliverable Ballots Received
Protestor states that she requested but was not provided a receipt from the Paso Robles Post Office where the Local 63 ballots returned as undeliverable (the “undeliverable ballots”) were held, so she was unable to verify the total number of undeliverable ballots. Catherine Burkhart stated told she told Stedronsky that USPS does not scan and record mail that cannot be delivered; the mail is simply sent back to the return address on the envelope with no receipt created. We confirmed that this statement was accurate.
UniLect maintained records of undeliverable ballots and brought the undeliverable ballots to the count. According to the final ballot reconciliation, there were 598 undeliverable ballots. Protestor acknowledges that she had the opportunity and did, in fact, review the undeliverable ballots. However, she states that she had limited time to do so and could not verify the total number. Stedronsky did not request additional time to count the undeliverable ballots, nor did any of the other Power for All Slate observers make such a request.
Alleged Violation of Observer Rights
The protestor acknowledges that Andrew Burkhart demonstrated in the Logic and Accuracy Test how the vote-counting system operates, and conducted a test run in front of the observers to show how it worked and that it was accurate. She acknowledges that he showed how the system processes ballots in groups or buckets, and he demonstrated how the start and end card tell the machine to begin counting a specific group of ballots. The total votes counted per group appears on the screen when it reaches the end card. Once each group is fully scanned, the system removes it from the active display on the screen. Andrew Burkhart confirmed that he does not enter the end card to formally close out a counting session until each group has been processed. According to the protestor, Andrew Burkhart did not, at any time during this demonstration, exit the screen or cover it up.
Andrew Burkhart also explained to the observers that the system could not automatically assign votes to individual candidates on the Slate Vote Only ballots (defined below) when there are more than 17 candidates on the ballot, as there were in Local 63’s delegate election. Accordingly, after the Slate Vote Only ballots were processed, he explained that he manually recorded the vote for each individual candidate on the slate voted for.
Following this demonstration, Andrew Burkhart began running the official ballot count for Local 63’s delegate election. The ballots were divided into three groups each with their own start and end card: (1) 001 – Slate Votes Only (i.e., voters chose an entire slate); (2) 002 – Slate and Individual Votes (i.e., the voter selected both a slate and individual candidates; and (3) 003 – Individual Votes Only (i.e., no slate, only individual selections).
UniLect allowed observers from each slate (including the protestor) to stand immediately next to Andrew Burkhart to observe not just the Logic and Accuracy Test but also the ballot count. According to OES representatives and UniLect, permitting observers to stand here provided the observers with more access than the Rules require. In past elections, observers have not been permitted to stand that close to the counting machine and have not been able to read the screen.
As the UniLect core staff opened the ballots, they separated each ballot into one of these three groups.[4] Andrew Burkhart first counted the Individual Votes Only (group 003). Next, he processed the Slate and Individual Votes (group 002) explaining the process as he went. The protestor states that observers were able to see this process, including the screen, the entire time.
Finally, Andrew Burkhart processed the Slate Only Votes (group 001). As with the two groups before, at the end card of this group, the screen showed the total number of votes counted in this group and, because it was the largest and the final group in the election, showed data that would reveal the results of the election.
Stedronsky inquired about why Andrew Burkhart did this. Consistent with his prior explanation of the process of Slate Only Votes, Andrew Burkhart responded that he had to record the slate votes to each candidate on the slate voted for. Catherine Burkhart then joined the conversation and said, “before he manipulates the numbers” and Andrew Burkhart repeated, “I need a printout before I manipulate them.” Both Burkharts explained that their use of the term “manipulation” referred only to recording the slate vote to each candidate and did not refer to the interference with the tally count. Following this response, protestor did not challenge Andrew Burkhart’s action or object to the process. The OES representatives who witnessed this exchange confirmed that this seemed clear to everyone and the process continued.
According to Andrew Burkhart, the federally certified election software UniLect uses to count ballots for IBT (and other) elections including Local 63’s delegate election, produces an encrypted audit log of all activity during operation. He explained that the audit log tracks all actions taken on the counting machine and the encryption acts to prevent any tampering of the contents of the audit log file. He explained that the audit log provides timestamps of all activity of the election software and that if there was an actual wrongful entry of votes, or purposeful misrepresentation of votes, it would appear in the audit log. The investigator reviewed the audit log with Andrew Burkhart to confirm the entries were appropriate and did not observe entries reflecting improper voter activity.
During the investigator, Andrew Burkhart explained that he covered the screen after the last group because it would reveal the outcome of the election to a small group of observers present before the final vote count was determined and announced to all present. He stated that, according to the audit log, the screen was covered for only 45 seconds while he entered the codes needed to manually record the slate votes and exit from the existing screen. These statements are consistent with his articulated explanation at the election. He adamantly denies typing or “tabulating” as protestor alleges.
Stedronsky states that during this process, she noticed that as the ballots were running through the counting machine the most common code that populated on the screen was 29. She asked Andrew Burhart what that code meant. According to protestor, he responded that he gets lots of codes from 1-28 regarding the position of the cards. When the protestor asked again what 29 was, he said he did not remember.
Andrew Burkhart confirmed during the investigation that code 29 is one of the codes related to the positioning of the ballots. Specifically, he said it means that the ballot is not properly aligned in the voting machine so it reads the wrong number of columns. This, like the other codes related to the position of the ballot, means that the machine automatically stops for him to reposition the ballot.
Following the count, an observer for each slate signed the Local Union Ballot Tally Certification (Form 13). Jerry Solera, one of the observers present, signed on behalf of the Power for All Slate. Specifically, he certified the following:
The undersigned acted as Election Officials or Observers at the tally of the ballots cast in the above-referenced election. We certify that the ballot tally was fairly and accurately conducted, the secrecy of the ballots was maintained and that the election results were as indicated below.
Schaaf also signed the Form 13 as the election official.
A total of 1,302 ballots were cast, 1,235 valid ballots were counted, and 67 unresolved ballots. There were no totally void ballots. The winning delegate candidate with the least number of votes received 872votes. The losing delegate candidate with the most votes received 258, making the margin for the delegate election 614. There were only seventeen (17) alternate delegates nominated and therefore deemed elected, so no alternate candidates appeared on the ballot.
The presence of ballots from prior elections in the Voted Ballot PO Box does not demonstrate a lack of security where ballots are properly safeguarded, traceable and handled in a manner that preserves their integrity. In Swaim, Post 64–LU 688-MOI (Apr. 10, 1991), protestor alleged that ballot security was compromised because voted ballots from other elections occurring simultaneously went to the wrong PO boxes and were intermingled with ballots in two other elections. The Election Officer held that the presence of intermingled ballots from different elections did not undermine the integrity of the election and even though ballots were removed from the post office on two separate occasions, because they remained secure and under the custody of post office personnel and election administrators at all times, and, therefore, did not compromise ballot security.
The evidence here shows that the Voted PO Box remained under restricted status beginning February 24, 2026 through the Local 63 delegate election when custody was transferred to UniLect and UniLect retained custody throughout the count. The outside envelope of each ballot was clearly labeled, segregated, and only valid Local 63 delegate ballots were counted, all in the presence of the observers. We find that the safeguards as discussed herein sufficiently preserved the integrity of the election. Particularly, where, as here, there is no evidence that the voted ballots were outside the custody of representatives of USPS or UniLect and its staff. UniLect and the post office explained the reason for the ballots from previous election being in the Voted Ballot PO Box at the time of the Local 63 delegate election. We find this explanation to be reasonable.
The evidence also shows that USPS does not generate receipts or official counts for undeliverable mail, a limitation outside of UniLect’s control, but that UniLect maintained its own accounting reflecting a total of 598 undeliverable ballots. See Swaim, Post 64–LU 688-MOI (Apr. 10, 1991) (holding that election administrators are not required to overcome inherent limitations of external systems, such as USPS recordkeeping practices, so long as reasonable procedures are employed).
Moreover, UniLect produced all of the undeliverable ballots at the count and afforded observers (including protestor) the opportunity to inspect them. Protestor states that she did not have adequate time to inspect these, but she did not request additional time to inspect them. There were also five other observers present representing the Power For All Slate.
In sum, we find there is no evidence to support protestor’s claims that the ballots were not properly secured.
Alleged Observer Rights Violations
Protestor alleges that the Power for All Slate’s observer rights were impaired during the ballot count when observers were unable to view part of the screen for a brief period (45 seconds) and undermining the transparency and integrity of the election.
Pursuant to Article IX, Section 6:
Observers shall be permitted to observe the election count. Observers shall be permitted to be present at the vote counting locations. Observers may challenge the eligibility of any voter to vote. Observers shall not interfere with the Election Supervisor or the Election Supervisor's representatives in the performance of their duties.
The right to observe includes the right to inspect the opening and set up of the counting machine(s) before the count of the ballots commences and to observe the verification of the eligibility of members who have cast ballots, the determination of eligibility of those members whose right to vote is challenged, the opening of the return ballot envelopes; the count of the votes; and the recording of the final vote count and the counting of the unused, voided and spoiled ballots. Observers shall be permitted to remain with the ballots from the time the count commences until the ballots are counted, including overnight if necessary.
The Election Rules guarantee observers the right to monitor all phases of the election process. The record shows that observers were given satisfactory and meaningful opportunity to understand and observe the election process. UniLect provided an explanation of the count process including the operation of the counting machine and observed the logic and accuracy test. Andrew Burkhart specifically explained the manual recording process for Slate Only Votes. UniLect permitted observers to stand right next to the counting machine, close enough to see all of the data and information on the screen—an opportunity that observers are not entitled to. The seconds when Andrew Burkhart covered a portion of the screen so that observers from neither side could see data disclosing the outcome of the election did not deprive any candidate of the ability to exercise observer rights. The total tally for the Slate Only Votes had been counted by the time he covered the screen. Notably, there is no evidence of voter fraud. Absent evidence linking the brief covering of a portion of the screen to any actual counting error, this allegation is speculative and does not establish a Rules violation.
Moreover, each observer at the count retained the right to observe the process including the conduct of the election workers and the right to challenge that process by stating their objection “immediately so corrective measures can be taken.” OES Rules for Observer Conduct. Protestor was present at the ballot count and personally observed Andrew Burkhart put his hand over a portion of the screen for seconds. Indeed, she questioned him about why he did so, further demonstrating her awareness of his action at that time. Historically, it has been the OES’s practice to announce the results at the same time to all present at the count. In response to protestor’s inquiry, he explained that he was covering the total tally of the Slate Only Votes because only a small portion of the observers who were permitted to stand immediately behind him right next to the machine could see the outcome of the election. This is consistent with his contemporaneous statement at the time of his action. At that time, protestor had a meaningful opportunity to formally object or request corrective action when the alleged irregularity could have been immediately investigated, halted or remedied. Protestor chose not to do so. Rather, she permitted the process to proceed and did not at that time raise any objection. In fact, following this conduct, an observer representing the Power for All Slate signed and certified the Form 13. It was not until days later—after the election had concluded—that the protestor formally challenged the conduct. This delay significantly limited, if not foreclosed, any opportunity to implement corrective measures before the election was completed..
Accordingly, we find that protestor had actual knowledge of the alleged issue, failed to timely object at a time that it could have been addressed before the election was over and, therefore, waived her right to object. Cf. Nuzzolilo, 2011 ESD 184 (Mar. 25, 2011) (finding that the protestor waived any objection to the ballot design by failing to object when the issue could have been addressed); McGowan, 2006 ESD 161 (Mar. 28, 20006) (protestor waived his right to observe the printing and mailing of ballots and could not later be heard on claims that his rights at those phases were violated). Minor, temporary limitations—particularly those that are explained at the time and not objected to—do not constitute a Rules violation absent evidence that they impaired the integrity of the count.
Under these circumstances, we find that the rights guaranteed to observers by Article IX, Section 6 were honored and, further, that the integrity of the tally of ballots in Local 63’s delegate and alternate delegate election was preserved.
Lastly, the protestor alleges that the Election Supervisor violated Article XIII, Section 2(f) by failing to issue decisions within seven days. However, the protestor filed numerous protests involving complex facts, multiple witnesses, and overlapping legal issues, all of which required substantial investigation, including interviews, document review, and legal analysis. The Rules require the Election Supervisor to evaluate protests on their merits and ensure a fair process, which necessarily permits adequate time for thorough factfinding. Under these circumstances, rigid adherence to a seven-day deadline would have undermined, rather than advanced, the integrity of the process. In any event, the protestor has shown no prejudice resulting from the timing of these decisions.
Accordingly, we DENY this protest.
APPELLATE RIGHTS
Any interested party not satisfied with this determination may, within three working days after the decision, appeal the decision to the Election Appeals Master. The appeal shall be made in writing and shall specify the basis for the appeal as required by the Rules. The parties are reminded that, absent extraordinary circumstances, no party may rely upon evidence that was not presented to the Office of the Election Supervisor in any such appeal. Requests for a hearing shall be made in writing, shall specify the basis for the appeal, and shall be served upon:
Election Appeals Master
Barbara Jones
Election Appeals Master
IBTappealsmaster@bracewell.com
Copies of the request for hearing must be served upon the parties, as well as upon the Election Supervisor for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Service may be accomplished by email, using the “reply all” function on the email by which the party received this decision. A copy of the protest must accompany the request for hearing. A copy of the protest must accompany the request for hearing.
Timothy S. Hillman
Election Supervisor
cc: Barbara Jones, IBTappealsmaster@bracewell.com
2026 ESD 108
DISTRIBUTION LIST (BY EMAIL UNLESS NOTED OTHERWISE):
Rosemary Stedronsky
Catherine Burkhart
John Palmer
Richard Hooker
Edward M. Gleason, Jr.,
James L. Donovan Jr.
David Suetholz
Will Bloom
Ken Paff
Thomas Kokalas
Timothy S. Hillman
Paul Dever
Deborah Schaaf
Kelly Hogan
[1] Review of the Final Ballot Reconciliation form shows that there were 75 late Local 63 officer election ballots and 55 late Local 166 officer election ballots. For the reasons set forth herein, the number of ballots from these unrelated elections are not material to this decision.
[2] Protestor’s attachment is dated as March 28,2026 but her email submitting it was sent on Monday, March 30, 2026. Post-election protests concerning alleged improper election day conduct must be filed within three working days of the posting of the official election tally sheet. See Rules, Art. XIII, Section 3(a).
[3] The box is not closed until all the late ballots have been collected, typically within a few weeks.
[4] In her protest, Stedronsky states, “When the Burkharts and the temps were opening the ballots, they were separating every ballot into one of these three piles.” This is a misunderstanding of the process. The temporary staff (trained by UniLect) removed the ballots from the secret ballot envelopes, but they did not separate the ballots into piles. Only UniLect core staff separated the ballots into the three groups.