OFFICE OF THE ELECTION SUPERVISOR
for the
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
IN RE: NEWMAN, LAURA ) Protest Decision 2025 ESD 25
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) Issued: December 31, 2025
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Protestor. ) OES Case No. P-030-111125
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INTRODUCTION
Laura Newman, member of Local 2010, ran as a candidate for delegate on the Members First slate in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters International Union Delegate and Officer Election (“Delegate Election”) and also ran in the Local 2010’s officer election (“Local Officer Election”). She has filed a protest alleging that the anonymity and integrity of the Delegate Election was compromised because observers could see how votes were cast on ballots through envelopes that accompanied the ballot. Specifically, Newman alleges that a completed ballot is “clearly legible to the eye when placed in both envelopes, as per instructions, and held to a household light.” She alleges that the ballot is not secret when the envelopes are “so translucent that the ballot can be seen (and how the voter voted) through BOTH envelopes held to a bedroom light.” Additionally, the protestor also alleges that the size of the post office box was too small for the number of ballots received.
Six days after Newman filed Protest No. P-030-111125, Marianna Battiste, who was also a candidate on the Members First slate, filed an addendum to the protest (the “Addendum”) (collectively, P-030-111125 and the Addendum are referred to as the “Protest” or “P-030”). As set forth in the Addendum, Battiste’s protest alleges that Jason Rabinowitz, the Principal Officer of Local 2010, failed to properly oversee Local 2010’s Delegate Election by failing to identify that the ballot envelopes were transparent, and allowing the use of undersized PO boxes located in close proximity to Local 2010’s office instead of UniLect Corporation, the independent company conducting the elections. Battiste sought clarification about the PO box where ballots for the Delegate Election were returned to such as 1) who has access, 2) whether there is a designated secure storage place for ballots received that do not fit in the PO box, 3) whether the PO box is in a public access area, 4) if there is 24/7 surveillance of the PO box, and 5) if there is a chain of custody log providing information about each time the PO box has been accessed and who accessed it.[1]
Deborah Schaaf of the Office of the Election Supervisor (“OES”) investigated this protest. The investigation included interviews of protestor Newman, Catherine Burkhart, Director of Election Services for UniLect Corporation, and Cornisha Trosclair, Lead Sales and Services Associate at the Airport Station United State Post Office located at 8495 Pardee Dr., Oakland, CA. Additionally, the investigation included review and analysis of all materials submitted by the interested parties and witnesses in connection to this protest and those otherwise obtained during the investigation. This included review and analysis of the ballot package for the Delegate Election sent by UniLect to the OES.
BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2025, the Election Supervisor approved Local 2010’s local union election plan (the “LUEP”) for the Delegate Election setting forth the relevant information on the nomination and election of delegates and alternate delegates for Local 2010.[2] Pursuant to the LUEP, the nomination meeting occurred on October 4, 2025, ballots were printed and mailed to members on November 3, 2025, and the ballot count occurred on December 2, 2025 (also referred to herein as “Election Day”). The ballot count occurred at Local 2010 located at 7730 Pardee Lane, Suite 2010 in Oakland, CA. Present at the ballot count were four UniLect staff, observers from both slates (16 total), and Robert Bonsall, the attorney for Local 2010. OES representatives Deborah Schaaf, Regional Director for the Far West Region, and Michael Miller, Adjunct Coordinator for the Far West Region, also attended and observed all aspects of the count.
UniLect Corporation
Per its LUEP, Local 2010 retained UniLect Corporation (“UniLect”), an independent third-party provider of election services, to administer the Delegate Election.[3] UniLect has been conducting local and national union elections full time since 2008, officer elections for the IBT since 2010, and delegate elections for the IBT since 2011. Since that time, UniLect has provided election services to many IBT locals in Joint Council 7 and Joint Council 42 for delegate, officer, and merger elections. Some of these locals have had white ballots, but most of them have utilized the full election services UniLect provides. In addition to working with the IBT, UniLect works with many other local and national unions, including but not limited to, the SEIU, IBEW, UFCW, IATSE, National Postal Mail Handlers, ATU, UBC, National Nurses United and the California Nurses Association.
According to Catherine Burkhart, in the 17 years UniLect has been conducting union elections, it has never received a complaint or been made aware of a complaint with allegations similar to those set forth in this Protest. Burkhart stated that UniLect has only been referenced in protests in two or three elections that has typically been due to a misunderstanding of the election process overall or a complaint that was not substantiated by any fact. She emphasized that UniLect has been careful not to become involved with the politics of any IBT election as it is an independent provider of election services. Significantly, Burkhart stated that UniLect has been asked to conduct elections with IBT locals even after elections they have administered result in changes to local leadership.
A summary of UniLect’s administration of Local 2010’s Delegate Election, as relevant to the allegations set forth in this Protest, is set forth below.[4]
PO Boxes
Immediately after the nomination meeting, and pursuant to their responsibilities under the LUEP, UniLect rented two PO boxes for the Delegate Election. The first PO box was to hold ballots voted on and returned by members (“Voted Ballot PO Box”) and the second PO box was to hold ballots the post office was unable to deliver (“Undeliverable PO Box”). The Voted Ballot PO Box (PO Box 14148), located at the at the Oakland Airport Station Post Office located at 8495 Pardee Drive, Oakland, CA (the “Post Office”), and the Undeliverable PO Box, located at USPS P.O. Box 4569 in Paso Robles, CA. See LUEP, p. 10.
Burkhart stated that UniLect does not keep (and never has kept) custody of the keys for the PO boxes used for elections throughout the election period. The post office holds all keys for such PO boxes. Burkhart stated that UniLect intentionally does not hold or have access to the keys because UniLect limits its access to ballots for election day when the observers are present. Burkart stated that consistent with her typical practice, she did not (nor did anyone else at UniLect) have access to the Voted Ballot PO Box for the Delegate Election. Burkhart’s statements are consistent with the documentary evidence and statements by Cornisha Trosclair, Lead Sales and Services Associate at the Post Office. For example, in an October 2, 2025 letter from Burkhart to Trosclair at the Post Office “RE: Teamsters Local 2010 Delegate Election 20205 POST BOX #14148 SPECIAL RESTRICTED ACCESS,” Burkhart wrote the following:
Dear Ms. Trosclair:
The UniLect Corporation is an independent provider of election services. We assist public and private entities with their election needs. As you are aware, Postal Box 14148 is being used for a Mail Ballot Delegate Election that we are administering on behalf of Teamsters Local 2010. This Postal Box will be used for all incoming Ballot Packets which voting members will be returning to us. Ballots will be mailed out on or around November 3, 2025, when the election period begins and will end on December 2, 2025, at 11:00 a.m., when we present at your Post Office to pick up the ballots.
This letter is to request your cooperation in securing Postal Box 14148 until December 2, 2025, which is Election Day for Local 2010. At 11:00 a.m. on 12/2/25, Catherine Burkhart with UniLect will be picking up all the returned Ballot Packets after providing identification. Very important: Only the authorized USPS Form 1093 UniLect representative with California identification is to be given the Post Box keys or access to the contents of Postal Box 14148 at the arranged time stated above. Under no circumstances should anyone be allowed to retrieve, remove, add mail to or even review the contents of Post Box 14148 until the authorized agent on USPS Form 1093 is present for pick-up and observers are present to observe the pickup of ballots.
UniLect will be in contact with you approximately one week prior to the close of the election to confirm the above. We appreciate your full assistance and diligence in this matter.
(emphasis in original).
Trosclair confirmed that UniLect rented PO Box 14148 for all incoming ballots returned in the Delegate Election for Local 2010. She confirmed that PO Box 14148 was secured as set forth in the letter referenced above since the time it was opened and that she informed all clerks about its special restricted access. Trosclair stated that “no one has been allowed to retrieve, remove, add mail to, or even review any of the contents inside [PO Box 14148] since the box was opened on November 2, 2025.” Trosclair confirmed that no keys for PO Box 14148 were issued until the count on December 2, 2025, when the Form 1093 applicant, Burkhart, presented her photo identification at the scheduled time with the observers present. This is consistent with Burkhart’s statements and Local 2010’s LUEP.
Trosclair stated that if the ballots sent to PO Box 14148 exceeded the dimensions of that PO box, the Post Office’s box clerk places the excess contents into what is referred to as a 775 tray next to the PO box. The 775 tray is located in a restricted area of the Post Office that the general public does not have access to and Trosclair confirmed that the contents of the 775 tray is as safe and secure as if it was inside the actual PO Box.
The number of ballots returned did, in fact, exceed the capacity for PO Box 14148 and were secured in a 775 tray. As discussed in further detail below, on Election Day, all of the ballots secured in the PO Box 14148 were placed inside and sealed the first four UniLect Ballot Boxes (discussed below) and all of the ballots secured in the 775 tray were placed and inside and sealed into the remaining three UniLect Ballot Boxes. There is no evidence to suggest that the ballots collected in the Voted Ballot PO Box, including the 755 tray (PO Box 14148 and the associated 775 tray are also referred to herein as the “Voted Ballot PO Box”), were not securely held at the Post Office throughout the election as required until the ballot count.[5]
The Ballot Package
Per the Delegate Manual, the ballot package mailed to members shall include: (1) instructions on how to fill out the ballot and return the ballot by mail; (2) a ballot; (3) a ballot secrecy sleeve or envelope to hold the voted ballot referred to as a secret ballot envelope or SBE; (4) a postage-paid envelope for returning the voted ballot by mail referred to as a ballot return envelope or BRE. The purpose of the secret ballot envelope is to protect the voter’s identity.[6] See Delegate Manual, p. 18. The return envelope contains the barcode and is mailed by the voter with the secret ballot envelope sealed inside to the post office. We confirmed that the ballot package for Local 2010’s Delegate Election included a ballot, notice of the election and instructions, a white secret ballot envelope, and a pink return envelope.[7] Burkhart stated that UniLect has been working with Roadrunner Print Mail on Local 2010 elections since the 2016 election.[8] The envelope paper used is manufactured by Shasta on #24 lb paper and ordered through Kelly-Spicer Co. Roadrunner Print Mail confirmed that there has been no change with the envelopes it orders.
The instructions included in the ballot package stated, in relevant part:
(1) Once you have reviewed your choices, carefully remove the PINK ballot stub receipt at the top of your ballot card along the perforation. Be careful NOT to tear the ballot card. Do NOT fold your ballot. (2) Insert the ballot into the envelope marked “Secret Ballot Envelope”. Seal the Secret Ballot Envelope. Do not put any identifiable marks on the Secret Ballot Envelope. Use of this envelope ensures the confidentiality of your vote. (3) Place the sealed Secret Ballot Envelope inside the PINK Return Envelope, seal and mail the PINK Return Envelope. Postage is already provided. Do not remove or deface your name and/or barcode information pre-printed on the back of your Pink Return Envelope. This identifying information on the return envelope must be visible to determine your eligibility to vote.
(emphasis in original).
UniLect Staff
UniLect had four trained core staff at the ballot count. This core staff controlled the ballot count process and managed interactions with observers. UniLect also hired nine trained temporary workers for the ballot count. The temporary workers removed the secret ballot envelopes from the return envelopes with the identifying information and then removed the ballots from the secret ballot envelopes.[9] UniLect core staff assisted the temporary workers by placing stacks of sliced open envelopes in front of them, removing piles of unopened secret ballot envelopes, and later removing piles of isolated ballot cards from the envelopes.
All staff are trained to always put the stacks of sliced open envelopes placed in front of temporary workers at tables with the name on the return envelopes facing down. UniLect core staff trained the temporary workers on how to remove all ballot envelope contents and instructed them to make sure that the name on the back of return envelopes must always be face down. Staff was given additional instructions to account for the various ways in which voters may return ballots (despite the instructions included in the ballot package). For example, some may use a secret ballot envelope, some may not, one voter may include more than one ballot in an envelope (e.g., members who live together and think they are saving the local postage money) or use an envelope containing no ballot. In the event that any of these situations occurred, temporary staff was instructed to immediately alert UniLect core staff. Ballots returned without a secret ballot envelope, were placed in a separate pile face down in front of the temporary worker.
Local 2010’s Ballot Count/Election Day
As a preliminary matter, we note that throughout the ballot count process on Election Day, only UniLect staff handled the ballots and envelopes in full view of observers, with the OES representatives present and making determinations on specific issues as they arose.
On December 2, 2025, at 11:00 AM UniLect picked up the ballots at the Post Office with two observers representing the Local 2010 Unity slate, Jennifer Casquiero and Jason Rabinowitz, and one observer representing the Local 2010 Members First slate, Jennifer Cruz. Specifically, Burkhart showed her photo identification to access the Voted Ballot PO Box for the first time. Custody of the contents of the Voted Ballot PO Box and its 775 tray was then transferred to UniLect’s Ballot Boxes and sealed with serial numbered seals. Observers present were asked to sign the ballot box seal log after witnessing all contents of the Voted Ballot PO Box were sealed inside the Ballot Boxes. Observers were not permitted to touch the envelopes or ballots. UniLect then safely secured the Ballot Boxes in the back of its vehicle and delivered them to Local 2010’s office, the location of the ballot count per the LUEP, located about a five-minute drive away from the Post Office.
UniLect set up tables in one long straight line at the ballot count site. Only Unilect staff was permitted behind the tables. Once back at the ballot count site, Burkhart introduced the UniLect staff to the observers present on Election Day and provided a brief overview of the ballot count process. Burkhart instructed all observers to stay behind the taped line set up for observers. The temporary workers were instructed not to interact with observers and to defer any question to UniLect core staff. At this time the envelopes and ballots were still located in the sealed Ballot Boxes.
UniLect then asked all observers that signed the Ballot Boxes seal log at the Post Office to inspect the Ballot Boxes including the sealed serial numbers to confirm all remained intact. The observers signed the Ballot Boxes seal log a final time without issue.
UniLect staff removed the seal from the UniLect Ballot Boxes, removed all envelopes therein and manually counted the ballots putting all envelopes in bundles of 25 ballots and into stacks of 4 bundles. UniLect staff then scanned the unique member barcodes on the backside of all ballot envelopes (by bundle) to obtain a list of all members who returned a ballot and confirm the manual count total. UniLect announced the scanned ballot return count to confirm the accuracy of the manual count. Any ballot envelope without identifying information (i.e. barcode, defaced or no hand-written name/ID identifier) was set aside in a manila envelope and voided.
Next, UniLect pulled out and set aside all member ballots showing up on the Local 2010 Election Control Roster (“ECR”)[10] as challenged (the “Challenged List’). UniLect provided the Challenged List to the OES representative who verified whether challenged member ballots were truly ineligible or eligible for ballot counting for any number of reasons. UniLect isolated all eligible ballots and set aside all other ballots.
UniLect then sliced open the identifying return envelopes using its high-speed envelope opener. After all return envelopes were opened, UniLect placed the opened return envelopes in piles on the tables with the identifying information of the voter faced down. UniLect staff then picked up each return envelope one-by-one and removed the secret ballot envelopes from the return envelopes. Per their instructions and training, as staff removed the secret ballot envelopes separating them from the return envelopes, they stacked the return envelopes face down so that member names were not visible. All empty identifying return envelopes were placed in storage boxes. Once all return envelopes were opened, placed face down, and separated from the secret ballot envelopes, UniLect sliced open the secret ballot envelopes and removed the official ballots. Like all empty return envelopes, all empty secret ballot envelopes were placed in storage boxes. UniLect conducted a visual inspection of every ballot to ensure the voter’s intent would be captured accurately by UniLect’s Optical Scan Ballot Reader. The process of separating each return ballot from the secret ballot envelope and placing it face down took less than five seconds. There is no evidence that at any point during this process UniLect staff held any envelope up to a light or otherwise manipulated any envelope in a manner to try to see how the ballot was marked while it was still inside either the return envelope or the secret ballot envelope. At no point during this process was any observer permitted to touch or handle the envelopes or ballots.
After completing the above process for all envelopes received, UniLect conducted its Logic & Accuracy Test to show that the vote counting software and hardware was counting accurately and in accordance with Rules. Observers signed the Logic & Accuracy Test documents confirming that they observed the test completed accurately. UniLect also printed a zero totals report showing that the ballot card reader was set to zero, which the observers signed off on. UniLect then began the ballot count of the isolated eligible ballots. The vote totals were not close enough where the challenged ballots could potentially impact the Delegate Election so, UniLect finalized the results and provided the final ballot reconciliation report and all election activity logs. All election materials were sealed in boxes and shipped to the OES offices in Washington D.C.
ANALYSIS
This Protest is being considered in the post-election context; therefore, we consider whether the alleged violations “may have affected the outcome of the election[.]” See Rules, Art. XIII, Section 3(b)(3); see also Art. XIII, Section 2(f)(2). Here, If the allegations in the protest were to be substantiated, it may impact the Election. “Ballot secrecy guarantees the right of IBT members to vote independently, and is fundamental to a free and fair election untainted by corruption.” Cheatem et al., POST 27-31-32-33-35-37-39-42-43-44-51 (Aug. 21, 1997). Thus, allegations of violations of ballot secrecy are taken seriously, and this protest was no exception.
Article II of the Rules governs the process for delegate elections for the convention. Pursuant to Article II of the Rules, “Elections for Convention delegate and alternate delegate positions shall be held by direct rank-and-file secret ballot voting.” (emphasis added). Article II, Section 15 provides further that:
No person or entity shall limit or interfere with the right of any IBT member to vote, including, but not necessarily limited to, the right to independently determine how to cast his/her vote, the right to mark his/her vote in secret and the right to mail the ballot himself/herself. No person or entity may encourage or require an IBT member to mark his/her ballot in the presence of another person or to give his/her ballot to any person or entity for marking or mailing.
(emphasis added).
Under the LMRDA, “secret ballot” is defined as “the expression by ballot, voting machine, or otherwise, but in no event by proxy, of a choice with respect to any election or vote taken upon any matter, which is cast in such a manner that the person expressing such choice cannot be identified with the choice expressed.” 29 U.S.C. § 402(k).
The Rules provide for specific requirements for the printing and pre-election handling of ballots. See Rules, Art. II, Section 10. For example, the Rules require a certain identification on the ballots, and specific instructions that must be included with each ballot.
The Rules strictly prohibit interference on voting.
No person or entity shall limit or interfere with the right of any IBT member to vote, including, but not necessarily limited to, the right to independently determine how to cast his/her vote, the right to mark his/her vote in secret and the right to mail the ballot himself/herself. No person or entity may encourage or require an IBT member to mark his/her ballot in the presence of another person or to give his/her ballot to any person or entity for marking or mailing.
Rules, Art. II, Section 15. A violation occurs when a member agrees to accept a ballot from another for the purpose of mailing, even where the member receiving the ballot did not request it.[11] Teamsters United, 2016 ESD 165 (April 8, 2016), aff’d, 2016 EAM 15 (Apr. 21, 2016); Hoffa-Hall 2016, 2016 ESD 325 (November 3, 2016).
Here, the protestor alleges that the ballots were not secret because the marked ballots were visible through the secret ballot envelope and the return envelope, therefore, how an individual voted could be identified. We disagree.
The protestor provided multiple photographs of the ballot: 1) a marked ballot inside the secret ballot envelope inside a white return envelope held up to a light; 2) a marked ballot inside the secret ballot envelop only that was pressed down; 3) a closeup of the barcode with Newman’s name in the return envelope. As an initial matter, we note that the photograph involving the white return ballot appears to be a ballot for the Local Election because the envelope states, “Teamsters Local 2010 Officer Election 2025” and because UniLect’s ballot package for the Delegate Election contained a pink return envelope, not a white one. To the extent the protestor’s allegations concern Local 2010’s Local Election, we have no jurisdiction. Rules, Art. I and II, Section 1.
Additionally, based upon our inspection of the Delegate Election ballot package with a marked ballot, secret ballot envelope and pink return envelope, it does not appear to be transparent where the viewer could read the marked ballot—not even when held up to a light source or when applying pressure in a manner that flattens the contents in an effort to read the contents therein. Moreover, we do not find that a marked ballot inside only a secret ballot envelope held in one’s hand is transparent where the viewer could read the marked ballot. Even to the extent it might be possible to discern ballot markings by holding the secret ballot envelope up close to a light source or by pressing down in a particular manner, neither of these actions were permitted during the tightly controlled ballot count process and there is no evidence to suggest that either of these actions occurred during Election Day.[12]
Instead, the evidence shows that the UniLect staff, who exclusively handled the envelopes and ballots on Election Day, did not—at any time—hold an envelope up to a light or otherwise manipulate the envelope in a manner to see or show observers how the ballot was marked while it was still inside either the return envelope or the secret ballot envelope. In fact, in compliance with their training, as staff removed the return envelopes with identifying information of the voter from the secret ballot envelopes (with the ballot inside), the return envelopes were immediately placed in one pile with the members names face down on the table while the secret ballot envelopes were placed in a separate pile on the table–a process that took less than five seconds. Observers were not permitted to, and did not, touch or otherwise manipulate the envelopes and no inspection of the envelopes in an attempt to see how a member voted occurred.[13] Once the return envelope is separated from the secret ballot envelope, there is no association between the secret ballot envelope or ballot and the individual identifying information on the return ballot. Said differently, once the envelopes are separated, there is no way to connect the voter with their ballot. Only after all return envelopes were opened, placed face down, and separated from the secret ballot envelopes, staff sliced open the secret ballot envelopes and removed the official ballots. See Delegate Manual, p. 27 (advising that after separating the return envelopes from the secret ballot envelopes, “[y]ou can maximize the chances of preserving secrecy by keeping these ballots in the SBE until you have collected all such ballots.”) (emphasis added).
We find that UniLect was scrupulous in how it administered the Delegate Election including taking appropriate steps to ensure that voter anonymity was preserved.[14] Cf. Cheatem et al., POST 27-31-32-33-35-37-39-42-43-44-51 (Aug. 21, 1997) (finding no violation where the Election Officer did not void ballots where the vote choices were not visible and voided ballots that the “workers could actually see how the ballots were marked”); Laurino et al., 2006 ESD 267 (May 23, 2006) (“while use of an internal secret ballot envelope, as provided in guidance from the Office of the Election Supervisor, makes it easier logistically to preserve voter anonymity at the count, the secrecy of the ballot can be preserved even without an inner envelope. At the Local Union 182 ballot count, steps were taken to preserve voter anonymity when ballots were removed and segregated from the return envelopes..”); Tenuto, 2006 ESD 285 (May 30, 2006) (“A ballot mailed in the ballot return envelope but not in the secret ballot envelope will be counted, assuming the member is an eligible voter, and will be treated in a way that maintains secrecy of the voter's choices among the candidates.”).[15]
We do not find that when a marked ballot was placed inside the secret ballot envelope and the return envelope it was transparent. We find that even to the extent it may be possible to view a marked ballot through the secret ballot envelope, it would require intentional and prohibited manipulation which did not occur here. We note that no protest was filed following the ballot count. In fact, as set forth in Local 2010’s ballot tally certification, observers on behalf of both slates certified that “the ballot tally was fairly and accurately conducts, the secrecy of the ballots was maintained…” Simply put, there is no evidence that anyone was able to actually see how any specific ballot was marked or that the secrecy of any specific ballot was compromised.[16]
Turning to the protestor’s allegations about or requests for clarification concerning the PO Box. As set forth above, the Voted Ballot PO Box and 775 tray (commonly used by the Post Office for larger elections similar to this one) were of sufficient size for the Delegate Election. See Delegate Manual, p. 17. The Post Office confirmed that the Voted Ballot PO Box and 775 (both with the same security protocols) were properly secured with access permitted only to authorized post office personnel[17] until the designated date/time on Election Day as set forth in the LUEP, and that the contents of the PO Box and 775 tray were not accessed until Election Day when UniLect secured the ballots in its custody, processed the ballots, and conducted the ballot count with observers present.[18] The protestor has not provided evidence to show that the PO Box where ballots were returned to somehow violated the Rules for lack of or inadequate security, access to, location or otherwise.
For all of the reasons set forth herein, we find that no violation occurred and DENY this protest.
APPELLATE RIGHTS
Any interested party not satisfied with this determination may request a hearing before the Election Appeals Master within two (2) working days of receipt of this decision. Any party requesting a hearing must comply with the requirements of Article XIII, Section 2(i). All parties are reminded that, absent extraordinary circumstances, no party may rely in any such appeal upon evidence that was not presented to the Office of the Election Supervisor. Requests for a hearing shall be made in writing, shall specify the basis for the appeal, and shall be served upon:
Election Appeals Master
Barbara Jones
Election Appeals Master
IBTappealsmaster@bracewell.com
Copies of the request for hearing must be served upon the parties, as well as upon the Election Supervisor for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Service may be accomplished by email, using the “reply all” function on the email by which the party received this decision. A copy of the protest must accompany the request for hearing. A copy of the protest must accompany the request for hearing.
Timothy S. Hillman
Election Supervisor
cc: Barbara Jones, IBTappealsmaster@bracewell.com
2025 ESD 25
DISTRIBUTION LIST (BY EMAIL UNLESS NOTED OTHERWISE):
Marianna Battiste
Jason Rabinowitz
Catherine Burkhart
Edward M. Gleason, Jr.,
David Suetholz
Will Bloom
Ken Paff
Thomas Kokalas
Timothy S. Hillman
Paul Dever
Kelly Hogan
[1] A protest with similar, if not identical, allegations as those set forth in P-030 was filed in connection with Local 2010’s Local Officer Election.
[2] Pursuant to the Rules, members are permitted to submit written comments about the LUEP. See Rules, Art. II, Section 4.
[3] Local 2010 also hired UniLect to administer its Local Officer Election running concurrently with the Delegate Election.
[4] UniLect conducts a similar process for all elections it administers, however, it varies slightly as required by any applicable constitution, bylaws or rules.
[5] In total, 1,815 ballots were secured in the Voted Ballot PO Box.
[6] The secret ballot envelope “must contain a prohibition against placing identifying information on it.” Id. UniLect’s secret ballot envelope for the Delegate Election complied with this requirement.
[7] The ballot package for the Local Officer Election included a white return envelope.
[8] Prior to 2016, UniLect used a mail-house that no longer exists to source and print the envelopes.
[9] UniLect screens staff to confirm that no worker has a connection to or conflict of interest related to the election.
[10] The ECR is a report generated by the TITAN system in a format designed specifically for elections. Each member’s name is labeled with either an “E” or a “C” indicator, which indicates the clearly eligible members and those whose right to vote is challenged. These indicators are presumptive, based upon dues payment data contained in the TITAN system. The ECR contains the same alphanumeric sequence number for each member as was assigned to the member when the ballot mailing list was prepared. This acts as a security measure. Delegate Manual, p. 17.
[11] There are certain exceptions to this rule.
[12] We emphasize (as discussed above) that interference with voting including, but not limited to, ballot collection, which includes the collection of ballots for marking or mailing (including even a sealed return envelope), is prohibited and that ballot interference prohibition is construed liberally. Hoffa-Hall 2016, 2016 ESD 325 (November 3, 2016) (citing Teamsters United, 2016 ESD 155 (March 29, 2016)). Therefore, our analysis focuses on the conduct at the ballot count.
[13] We note that even if both the envelopes were transparent (which we do not find) there still would not be a sufficient opportunity to identify the voter and read how they voted during this process. This process takes less than five seconds during which the UniLect staff is holding the envelopes, and moving them around to open the return envelope, pull out the secret ballot envelope, and immediately placing the identifying information downward. The other return ballots are on the table with the identifying voter information faced down. Thus, assuming arguendo that both envelopes were transparent (they are not), an observer would not be able to identify the voter.
[14] There is no evidence that UniLect acted inappropriately. To the extent the protestor implies otherwise, we reject these allegations as they are entirely speculative absent any supporting evidence.
[15] While not directly on point, the decisions in Laurino et al., 2006 ESD 267 (May 23, 2006) and Tenuto, 2006 ESD 285 (May 30, 2006), demonstrate that even if a secret ballot envelope is not used, which would present an increased concern about maintaining the secrecy of the ballot than use of one that may, with manipulation, be transparent, or partially transparent, the Rules are not violated provided the anonymity is maintained and the ballot is treated in a way that maintains secrecy of the voter’s choices. We find that UniLect ensured the secrecy of voter’s choices here.
[16] While the Addendum includes inquiries about the PO box, it also includes additional allegations against Rabinowitz, as Principal Officer of Local 2010, for failing to properly oversee the election. We find these allegations to be untimely. The allegations in the Addendum arise out of the same or similar conduct alleged in Protest No. P-030-111125. Battiste was aware of the allegations giving rise to the Addendum since she was cc’d on Newman’s protest filed on November 11, 2025, but did not file the Addendum until six days later. See Rules, Art. XIII, Section 2(b). Moreover, had the Addendum been filed timely, for the same reasons we do not find that the underlying conduct alleged in Protest No. P-030-111125 violated the Rules, we do not find that Rabinowitz failed to properly oversee the election process based on such conduct.
[17] We note that the protestor has not alleged any wrongdoing on behalf of any postal personnel.
[18] No protest was filed following Election Day.